Pasadena PWP is increasing EV charging rates at the city owned chargers. The increase is effective Nov 12, 2025. The new rates are still substantially lower than those being charged by Tesla and other operators.
These are the new rates.
It is interesting that that the low end can be $0 which means PWP could make the charging free, but this is unclear.
So from FY 25 to FY 26 the rates do not change.
Also notice that the overstay fees can be up to $6 per hour… Tesla charges $1 per minute overstay fees.
Pasadena PWP also has posted 2 hour signs on DC FC, which is absolutely ridiculous. 1 hour should be the maximum that DC FC should be occupied. If there is nobody waiting then move to another charger or disconnect and start a new session. But to post a 2 hour limit on DC Fast Charging is absurd.
The Los Angeles County Post–Fire Air, Soil, and Water AssessmentDashboard is updated continually as newassessmentresults are made available. Residents are encouraged to check the dashboard regularly for updates. Changes are highlighted in the “Latest Updates” section on the homepage.
Key updates made since mid-September are summarized below:
Updated section to add links to the PHOENIX air quality map and a summary of initial findings from data collected through April.
6. Air, Soil, and Pool Testing by Community Action Project Los Angeles (CAP.LA)
Added three new sections with information on air monitoring, soil testing, and pool water quality testing conducted by the CAP.LA collaborative research project.
The $4.7 Million Paradox: Pasadena’s Rent Board Delivers High Costs, Unspent Funds, and Escalating Controversy
When Pasadena voters passed Measure H, they ushered in a new era of tenant protections, creating a powerful Rent Stabilization Department (RSD) and a 13-member Rental Housing Board (PRHB) to protect housing stability. Yet, nearly three years after its passage, the new bureaucracy is mired in a paradox: it is funded by millions of dollars in escalating fees levied on landlords, while its own budget reports reveal a staggering failure to spend those funds.
This operational paralysis has left the department’s director, Helen Morales, and the board caught between an enraged landlord community that feels financially targeted and a tenant population still waiting for the full-scale services they were promised.
The New Bureaucracy and Its Leadership
The new city apparatus is led by two key bodies. The first is the Rent Stabilization Department, the administrative wing led by Director Helen Morales, who was appointed in mid-2024. Morales, who previously established a similar division in Beverly Hills, was hired to build the department from the ground up, tasked with everything from implementing a rental registry to educating the public.
The second, and more powerful, body is the Pasadena Rental Housing Board (PRHB), a body with the authority to set rent adjustments, establish regulations, and hear petitions. This board, recently appointing new leadership with Tenant Representative Allison Henry as Chair and At-Large Member Lourdes Gonzalez as Vice-Chair, has become the epicenter of the controversy.
From the moment of its inception, landlord groups have decried the board’s composition as “extremely lopsided.” Critics, such as the Apartment Association of Greater Los Angeles (AAGLA), have publicly claimed the board is dominated by renter-advocates, with insufficient representation for housing providers. This perceived imbalance has fostered a deep-seated distrust, with landlords arguing their concerns are systematically dismissed during public comment, creating an adversarial, rather than regulatory, relationship.
The High Cost of Stabilization
The entire $4.7 million budget of the Rent Stabilization Department is funded not by general city taxes, but by a “Rental Housing Fee” charged directly to landlords for every rental unit they own.
This fee has become a flashpoint. In August 2025, the Rental Housing Board voted to set the 2025-2026 landlord registration fee at $238 per unit. This was a significant hike from the previous year, which itself was a complex, multi-part fee. Landlords who fail to pay face escalating late fees of up to 50% per unit, adding another financial threat.
Department staff justified the increase by explaining that the program’s total costs, including a negative cash balance of over $566,000 from its chaotic launch, had to be divided among a smaller-than-expected pool of eligible units. After thousands of units were found to be exempt, the remaining housing providers were left to cover the entire department’s budget.
For landlords, this is a direct, non-recoverable financial burden. Groups like the Pasadena-Foothills Association of Realtors (PFAR) have argued this “unfair burden” essentially forces the private sector to subsidize a city bureaucracy. This sentiment is the driving force behind a major lawsuit from the California Apartment Association (CAA), which is challenging the legality of Measure H’s relocation assistance requirements, arguing they conflict with state laws like the Costa-Hawkins Act.
The $2.1 Million Question: Services Not Rendered
If the high cost to landlords is one side of the coin, the other is the department’s documented failure to deploy these funds. This is the core of the “services not rendered” critique.
A quarterly budget update presented in April 2025 revealed a stunning fact: with 75% of the fiscal year completed, the Rent Stabilization Department had underspent its $4.7 million budget by 45%.
More than $2.1 million in collected fees sat unused.
The department’s official explanation cited “staff turnover in senior positions” and massive unspent funds in “Services and supplies.” This budget line, intended for contracts, outreach, and technology, was reportedly 60% unspent.
This figure is the most damning evidence for those questioning the department’s efficacy. It raises a critical question: If the department is successfully collecting millions in mandatory fees, why is it failing to execute its most basic function—spending that money to provide services?
For tenants, this underspending represents a profound missed opportunity. That $2.1 million was not just a number on a ledger; it was the budget for the very programs Measure H promised. It was funding for more housing counselors, robust community outreach, a fully functional petitions and hearings program, and legal support for tenants facing eviction. While the department has offered some walk-in sessions for registry help and basic FAQs on its website, its own reports prove it is operating at just over half-capacity.
The department, under Director Helen Morales, is charging landlords for a fully-funded, fully-operational department while delivering—by its own financial admission—a shadow of one.
A Mandate Mired in Conflict
The Pasadena Rent Stabilization Department and its oversight board are failing to satisfy either of the constituents they serve.
Landlords feel they are being financially punished by a “lopsided” board that raises their fees by nearly 100% to cover its own launch-year deficits. They see a system that is quick to levy penalties but deaf to their concerns about maintenance costs and inflation.
Tenants, meanwhile, are the beneficiaries of a department that is, on paper, one of the best-funded in the region but is operationally hamstrung, failing to spend millions of dollars collected in its name.
The mandate of Measure H was to provide stability. Instead, its implementation has created a new, expensive bureaucracy defined by legal battles, financial penalties, and a critical inability to perform the very services it was created to fund.
For more information, here is a video update from Pasadena Media about the new leadership elected to the Rental Housing Board. This clip discusses the board’s mission and the transition from its previous chair, Ryan Bell.
PMN – New Leadership Elected to Pasadena Rental Housing Board
I cannot say that I am surprise by this announcement.
This just was announced. While we don’t know if there is anything further behind this announcement. It is clear that the city manager who started three years ago is now leaving.
Typically when one person in a high position retires there will be others.
From my experience dealing with Mr. Marquez was difficult to say the least, his secretary was not helpful at all and had an attitude when trying to get a call back.
Which I never did ever get a return phone call. This alone is what is wrong with the city manager position in Pasadena. At least previous city managers would return a phone call or email.
We hope this will change. When the city looks for a replacement which will most likely be someone from within, that needs to be an absolute, that the person in this position communicates and returns emails and phone calls to the stakeholders of the city.
We wish Mr. Marquez the best in the future and dealing with his family issues.
Pasadena City Manager
Miguel Márquez Announces Retirement
PASADENA, Calif. — The Pasadena City Council announces the decision by City Manager Miguel Márquez to retire from his position as the City’s Chief Administrative Officer so he can focus on family during a time of significant personal need.
Mr. Márquez joined the City in August 2022, bringing with him a distinguished record of public service, including his most recent role as Chief Operating Officer of Santa Clara County and his service as an Associate Justice of California’s Sixth District Court of Appeal. His leadership came at a pivotal time for Pasadena; he has been instrumental in guiding the City through several unprecedented challenges.
During his tenure, Mr. Márquez led with integrity, compassion, and a steady hand. He appointed the majority of the City’s current executive leadership team, assembling a diverse and highly capable group of professionals dedicated to collaborative governance and excellence in public service. Under his leadership, the City, among other things:
Maintained fiscal stability during uncertain times, with a balanced budget each year and financial reserves restored to pre-pandemic levels;
Secured labor peace through long-term contracts with the City’s employee unions;
Successfully passed Measures PL and L to support the retrofit and upgrade of the City’s historic Central Library, and to provide operational support for libraries citywide;
Invested millions of dollars to upgrade aging police and fire equipment to enhance the City’s public safety response efforts;
Invested millions of dollars to improve the City’s streets;
Procured more than $1B in long-term contracts for carbon-free energy, keeping the City on pace to exceed the State’s carbon-neutral mandate at least 15 years early, and making significant progress (92%) on the City’s goal of 100% carbon-free energy by 2030; and
Led a comprehensive response and recovery effort following the devastating windstorm and Eaton Fire earlier this year.
Mr. Márquez has built strong, collaborative relationships with each member of the City Council and is widely respected for his intelligence, fairness, and humility. He is not only a trusted leader but also a valued member of the Pasadena family.
“While Miguel’s departure is a significant loss for our City, we fully support his decision to prioritize his family,” said Mayor and Chief Executive Officer, Victor Gordo. “We are deeply grateful for his service and the example he has set of selfless, principled leadership.”
In reflecting on his decision, Mr. Márquez shared:
“Serving the people of Pasadena has been one of the greatest honors of my career. I’m incredibly proud of what we’ve accomplished together, and I’m grateful for the trust and support of the City Council, our dedicated staff, and this remarkable community. In light of my father’s recent passing, my family needs me at this time, and I need to be there for them. I leave knowing the City is fiscally stable, in good hands, and is on a solid path forward.”
Mr. Márquez is expected to continue to serve as City Manager until a permanent successor is appointed, ensuring a smooth and thoughtful transition.
Press release graphic featuring a portrait photo of Pasadena City Manager Miguel Márquez. The graphic is titled ‘Pasadena City Manager Miguel Márquez Announces Retirement.’
Pasadena’s Data-Blind DOT: City’s Speed Signs Are Expensive ‘Feel-Good’ Failures
Across Pasadena, from leafy residential streets to busy arterials, they glow like electronic scarecrows: “YOUR SPEED IS…” signs, flashing a digital warning at passing drivers. For frustrated residents, they are a flimsy, “feel-good” gesture against a tidal wave of dangerous speeding.
But the real controversy isn’t just that drivers ignore them. The real scandal is that the Pasadena Department of Transportation (DOT) is actively ignoring the most valuable function these signs possess: data.
Recent public reports indicate that the DOT has decided to stop collecting the speed data from these devices.This decision, reportedly made to save staff time and resources, effectively renders these expensive radar-equipped signs “dumb,” turning a potentially powerful safety tool into a blinking placebo.
A Goldmine of Data, Willfully Ignored
This isn’t just a minor administrative change. According to the city’s own official traffic engineering policies, data is the bedrock of all safety improvements. To qualify for traffic calming measures like speed humps, a street must have “documented speeding issues as evidenced by higher operating speeds.”
The speed feedback signs are the most efficient and accurate way to get that 24/7 data.
This “uncollected” data is a goldmine that could be used to:
Prove the Problem: Give DOT and the Pasadena Police Department (PPD) an undeniable, 24/7 log of speeding hotspots, rather than relying on anecdotal resident complaints.
Target Enforcement: Tell PPD exactly where and when to deploy patrols for maximum impact, instead of random, inefficient enforcement.
Justify Action: Provide the hard evidence needed to approve speed humps, road redesigns, or other measures that actually slow cars down.
Instead, residents who complain about speeding are in a “Catch-22.” They are told they need data to prove a speeding problem, while the city simultaneously refuses to collect the very data that would prove it.
Leadership “Chasing Shiny Objects”
This decision lands squarely at the feet of the Director of Transportation, Joaquin Siques.
Under Siques’s leadership, the DOT is aggressively pursuing massive, nine-figure grants for “shiny objects” like the hydrogen bus program. Yet, it claims it doesn’t have the staff capacity for the basic, fundamental task of downloading a data file from a sign that is already in place.
This move seems to directly contradict the DOT’s other major initiatives. The city is currently developing a “Vision Zero” plan to eliminate all traffic fatalities by 2035, identifying “Unsafe Speed” as a primary emphasis area. How can the city claim to be serious about a “data-driven” safety plan when it is deliberately blinding itself to its best source of speed data?
Critics from the community have been blunt. One resident recently stated online that the DOT’s claim that collecting the data is “not worth it” is “absolutely ridiculous,” especially as “accidents [are] increasing” and “pedestrians being hit.”
While the DOT busies itself with future-facing projects, its core mission of managing current street safety is failing. The “Your Speed” signs are a perfect symbol of this failure: a visible, expensive piece of technology deployed for public relations, but intentionally neutered of its actual power.
Pasadena’s Great EV Misfire: How a $10M+ Bet Left Drivers Stranded
Pasadena, a city that prides itself on being an early adopter of green technology, is now facing a system-wide failure of its public electric vehicle infrastructure. After investing millions to build one of the nation’s largest municipal charging networks, Pasadena Water and Power (PWP) is presiding over a field of broken, offline, and unreliable DC fast chargers, leaving EV drivers stranded and furious.
Publicly available data from the city itself paints a grim picture: at one point, nearly two-thirds of the city’s 45 DC fast chargers were offline. This “robust” network, once a crown jewel, has become a multi-million dollar monument to a failed bet.
The Cascade of Failures
The core of this meltdown is a catastrophic supply chain and vendor collapse. PWP’s primary partner in this venture was Tritium, an Australian manufacturer that supplied the bulk of the city’s fast chargers. In August 2024, Tritium declared bankruptcy.
According to a PWP public notice, the company that acquired Tritium’s assets, Exicom, is only honoring warranties for parts, not for the labor to install them. This has left Pasadena holding the bag on dozens of highly complex, broken machines with no one to fix them.
To compound the disaster, the city’s software and network provider, Shell Recharge, abruptly terminated its EV services in March 2025. This forced PWP into a hurried contract with a new provider, PowerFlex, a switch that has been plagued by user complaints of a buggy app and failed charging sessions.
The result is a near-total collapse at key locations:
Del Mar Garage: 100% of fast chargers (3 of 3) offline.
Arroyo Parkway (Glenarm): 100% of fast chargers (6 of 6) offline.
Marengo Garage: 60% of fast chargers (12 of 20) offline.
Victory Park: 100% of fast chargers (3 of 3) offline and now slated for total replacement.
“Should We Be in This Business?”
The debacle has not gone unnoticed at City Hall. During a May 2025 budget workshop for the Municipal Services Committee, a frustrated Councilmember Tyron Hampton, himself a long-time EV driver, openly questioned the entire endeavor.
“Right now, there’s so many repairs that it’s almost as if we should discuss whether we should be in this business,” Hampton stated, giving voice to a growing sentiment among residents who feel the city’s experiment has failed.
The city’s response, led by PWP General Manager David Reyes, has been to manage the crisis. Reyes acknowledged the severe operational challenges, and PWP has scrambled to find solutions, including plans for a “real-time online dashboard” to show drivers which of the few remaining chargers are actually working.
Adding Insult to Injury
For residents and visiting EV drivers, the situation has become a frustrating game of “charger roulette.” Angry posts on social media and public forums like Reddit decry the network as “100% unreliable.” Drivers report arriving at garages with low batteries, only to find every single charger out of service.
In a move that baffled many, PWP also implemented a two-hour parking limit for its fast chargers—machines designed to charge a car in 30-60 minutes. This “shortsighted” policy, as one critic called it, encourages drivers to abandon their cars for hours, blocking the few functional chargers and making a bad situation even worse.
Pasadena bet big on a single, unproven hardware vendor and lost. Now, as the city struggles to replace entire lots of chargers and pivots to yet another software platform, its residents are left paying the price—stuck with a “state-of-the-art” network that doesn’t work.
Pasadena’s $32 Million Hydrogen Gamble: A Clean Future or a Risky Boondoggle?
On August 25, 2025, the Pasadena City Council approved a $32 million contract to purchase 17 hydrogen fuel cell buses, a move championed by city staff as a major step toward a zero-emission transit fleet.The decision, however, has ignited a sharp debate, pitting the city’s green ambitions against pressing concerns over staggering costs, unproven technology, and the potential dangers of placing high-pressure hydrogen infrastructure near residential communities.
While the city celebrates the move, critics, including one dissenting council member, have labeled the venture a high-risk gamble with taxpayer-guaranteed funds.
The Decision-Makers and the “Pro-Hydrogen” Case
The push for hydrogen was led by Pasadena’s Department of Transportation (DOT), directed by Joaquin Siques.Siques and his team presented the plan to the City Council, arguing that hydrogen buses are essential for meeting the city’s service demands.They claim hydrogen offers a longer range and faster refueling time than battery-electric buses, which staff said would require “doubling the fleet” to provide the same level of service.
The $32 million contract was approved by the council, with Mayor Victor Gordo and councilmembers like Gene Masuda and Steve Madison voicing support. Their argument rests on two key points:
It’s “Free Money”: The vast majority of the contract (approximately $29 million) is funded by state and regional air quality grants, with only about $3 million coming from local transit funds. Proponents argued it was crucial to seize this external funding.
Meeting Mandates: The purchase accelerates Pasadena’s compliance with California’s Innovative Clean Transit regulation, transitioning 46% of the city’s fleet to zero-emission by 2027.
The “Con” Case: A “Massive Boondoggle”
The approval was not unanimous. Councilmember Rick Cole cast the sole dissenting vote, raising serious concerns about the project’s financial risk and environmental efficacy.
Cole’s dissent reflects a growing body of criticism against hydrogen fuel cell technology, which many experts and environmental critics have called a “massive boondoggle.” The key arguments against the venture include:
Exorbitant Fueling Costs: While the buses themselves are paid for by grants, critics point to the astronomical long-term operational costs.Studies and data from other transit agencies show that fueling a hydrogen bus can be eight to ten times more expensive than charging a battery-electric equivalent.One analysis suggests a hydrogen bus could cost $200,000 per year in fuel, compared to just $24,000 for an electric bus.
The “Green” Hydrogen Myth: Councilmember Cole argued that hydrogen is “not zero emission.” This is because the vast majority of commercially available hydrogen is “gray hydrogen,” produced from natural gas (methane) in a process that releases significant carbon dioxide. “Green” hydrogen, made using renewable energy, is not yet viable at scale, leading critics to claim the city is simply swapping one fossil fuel for another, less efficient one.
Reliability and Maintenance: Data from other transit agencies operating hydrogen buses has shown them to be less reliable and have maintenance costs 50% higher than their internal combustion counterparts, leading to more service disruptions.
Danger in the Community?
Perhaps the most immediate concern for residents is the infrastructure required. The project includes a new hydrogen fueling station planned for 159 S. Kinneloa Avenue in East Pasadena.
This plan brings the “danger” element of hydrogen technology into a dense, urban setting. Safety experts note that hydrogen poses unique risks:
Extreme Flammability: Hydrogen is highly flammable, with a much wider range of explosive concentrations in the air (4% to 75%) than gasoline.
Low Ignition Energy: It requires very little energy to ignite—a simple static spark can be enough.
High-Pressure Storage: The fuel is stored on buses and at the station in tanks under immense pressure (5,000 to 10,000 psi). While tanks are built to stringent safety standards, the risk of a catastrophic failure, whether from a manufacturing defect, collision, or fire, is a significant concern.
Invisible Flame: Hydrogen fires are nearly invisible to the naked eye, complicating emergency response.
Critics argue that placing this high-pressure, explosive infrastructure in a residential and commercial corridor is an unnecessary risk, especially when a safer, cheaper, and more efficient alternative—battery-electric charging—is readily available.
As Pasadena moves forward with its $32 million venture, the city finds itself at the center of a national debate. Is it a pioneer of a clean hydrogen future, or has it locked itself into a costly and potentially dangerous technological dead end, all while being urged on by the council majority and DOT Director Joaquin Siques?
After some back and forth Pasadena city council approved what by many residents and those in the community as a stunning move to approve their own salary increases.
The increase from what previously more than what a lot of people in Pasadena earn, is now almost doubled. Including allowances for home offices and childcare.
In the face of a budget shortfalls and increasing costs, the timing of those could not have been any worse. And that all council members approved their own salary increases speaks volumes about what is wrong with the city and the way it operates. Like the editorial in Colorado Blvd.net writes It’s the elite of Pasadena giving themselves a raise.
The only council member voting against this was Steve Madison district 6.
The council meeting spent time discussing ways to make it appear that the increase was not as much as it really is… this is shocking.
The committee meet over seven meetings and for several hours.
It does not go into effect until 2026-2027. Fiscal year beginning July 1, 2026.
What’s the impact on the budget.
There are still a lot of questions… in particular regarding security and how the money is allowed to be spent. And reimbursed.
Pasadena standing to lose millions in revenue is now faced with another setback and blow with UCLA looking to leave the Rose Bowl for Sofi Stadium. Sofi a much more modern and centrally located stadium would potential increase attendance to UCLA games.
Has Pasadena now become a litigious city looking to sue and not find ways to work things out with a partner like UCLA? It certainly will leave lasting damage in a relationship if your alleged business partner is getting sued.
UCLA has been at the Rose Bowl for 40 years.
Administrative Vice Chancellor Michael Beck was a past Pasadena city manager.
Pasadena Speed Feedback Signs and Pasadena Transportation Department Procedures
Recently Pasadena Department of Transportation decided to stop collecting the data from numerous speed feedback signs around the city.
There are over 50 but not all of them collect data.
There are also many that do not work.
What was the reason for Pasadena DOT Director for no longer having staff collect the data?
Was it taking too long?
Was the data evidence of a larger issue?
Was DOT staff not capable of collecting the data?
Based on my interaction with DOT it is a combination of the above. Most mostly DOT not wanting to collect the data because the effort and time it takes. Which is absolutely ridiculous and should be investigated further.
I have a public records request for all documents related to the speed feedback signs, because even if DOT refuses to collect the data, they need to make sure the signs are operational.
Of course DOT has moved on to the next shiny object. Which is a hydrogen fueling station and several hydrogen powered buses at a cost of over $130Million.
If DOT cannot manage 50 speed feedback signs, why would anyone think they can manage a potential very dangerous and complicated process. Are they putting neighbors at risk with this project? Who on staff is knowledgeable on how hydrogen fueling works? Or is DOT relying on consultants and contractors to do the work and have an easy point the finger when things go wrong?
We just an experience with the new GM design facility where a prototype EV vehicle caught fire and cause a five alarm fire pulling in resources from around the region costing tax payers millions.
